WORKERS'

COMPENSATION-INDEMNITY-WORKERS'

COM-

PENSATION ACT BARS THIRD-PARTY MANUFACTURER'S RECOVERY OF CONTRIBUTION

OR IMPLIED INDEMNIFICATION FROM

NEGLIGENT EMPLOYER-Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries,
103 N.J. 177, 510 A.2d 1152 (1986); Stephenson v. R.A. Jones
& Co., Inc., 103 N.J. 194, 510 A.2d 1161 (1986).
Compensation' is a central theme of the American legal system. While this concept is ideologically simplistic, complex
products liability litigation has focused on determining who is responsible for compensating the individual that has been injured.3
One recurring issue which has caused substantial controversy is
whether a manufacturer can recover indemnification 4 or contribution 5 from an injured worker's employer if the employer's negligence was also a proximate cause of the employee's injury. 6 In
addressing this issue, New Jersey courts have steadfastly aligned
themselves with the majority of jurisdictions that deny contribution.7 Additionally, NewJersey courts refuse indemnification unI Compensation is defined as "[t]hat which is necessary to restore an injured
party to his former position." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (5th ed. 1979).
2 See Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 226, 241 A.2d 637, 639 (App.
Div. 1968) (Botter, J., dissenting). In primitive cultures, the primary objective of
compensation was vengeance against the person or object which caused the injury.
Id.
3 See Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Compensation Employer, 1982
DUKE

L.J. 483, 487.

Indemnity is defined as "liability for loss shifted from one person held legally
responsible to another person." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 692 (5th ed. 1979). Indemnity which may be based on either an express or implied promise shifts the
entire loss from one party to another. See Comment, The Effect of Workers' Compensation Laws on the Right of a Third Party Liable to an Injured Employee to Recover Contribution
or Indemnity from the Employer, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 238, 241 (1978); see also George
M. Brewster & Son, Inc. v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 28, 109 A.2d 805, 809
(1954); Rommell v. United States Steel Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 30, 42, 168 A.2d 437,
443 (App. Div. 1961).
5 While contribution is based on equitable principles, it is a statutory right
which requires that all joint tortfeasors share the loss. See Comment, supra note 4,
at 241-42; see also Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1076 (3d Cir.
1983).
6 See A. LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 77.10, at 607 (1984). This is
"[p]erhaps the most evenly balanced controversy in all of compensation law ..
"
Id.; see also Robinson, Workmen's Compensation: The Third Party Dilemma, 19 IDAHO L.
REV. 259, 264 (1983).
7 See, e.g., A.A. Equip., Inc. v. Farmoil, Inc., 31 Conn. Supp. 322, 322-25, 330
A.2d 99, 100-01 (Super. Ct. 1974); Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr.
Co., 280 S.W. 2d 179, 184-85 (Ky. 1955); Herbert v. Blankenship, 187 So. 2d 798,
801 (La. Ct. App. 1966); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westerlind, 374 Mass. 524, 526,
373 N.E.2d 957, 958-59 (1978); Schweizer v. Elox Div. of Colt Ind., 70 N.J. 280,
4
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less the parties' actions fall within one of the judicially created
exceptions to the exclusivity provision contained in the Workers'
Compensation statute.' Recently this conservative stance was
confirmed in the companion cases of Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries9 and Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co., Inc. "o

The facts giving rise to both these lawsuits concerned industrial accidents. In Ramos, the plaintiff, an employee of Laminating Corporation of America (LCA), suffered serious injuries
when a 400-pound drum he was wheeling across LCA's yard
rolled off its cart and onto his leg." The cart had struck a snowcovered hole created by Browning Ferris Industries of South
Jersey, Inc. (BFI) while their trucks were hauling containers to
and from LCA's premises.' 2
Ramos filed suit against BFI who filed a cross-claim against
the plaintiff's employer, LCA.' 3 In granting summary judgment
for LCA, the trial court determined that the indemnification
clause in the parties' contract did not require LCA to indemnify
BFI.' 4 Subsequently, ajury found BFI seventy-five percent negligent in causing Ramos' injuries and determined that Ramos him286-87, 359 A.2d 857, 860-61 (1976); Farren v. NewJersey Turnpike Auth., 31 N.J.
Super. 356, 360-61, 106 A.2d 752, 754-55 (App. Div. 1954); Arcell v. Ashland
Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 483-85, 378 A.2d 53, 59-60 (Law Div. 1977).
8 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:15-1 to -127 (West 1952). The statute provides that
an agreement between an employer and employee to provide recovery for employment-related injuries through the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation laws
shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other
method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof
than as provided in this article and an acceptance of all the provisions of
this article, and shall bind the employee and for compensation for the
employee's death shall bind the employee's personal representatives,
surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the employer, and those
conducting
the employer's
business during
bankruptcy or
insolvency....
Id. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1986).
Although the New Jersey statute is entitled Workmen's Compensation, this
type of statute is commonly referred to as Workers' Compensation to avoid genderbased discrimination. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 6, § 1, at 1.
9 103 N.J. 177, 510 A.2d 1152 (1986).
10 103 N.J. 194, 510 A.2d 1161 (1986).
1I Ramos, 103 N.J. at 182, 510 A.2d at 1154.
12

Id.

13 Id.
14 Id. BFI and LCA had executed a "service agreement" whereby LCA, as the

customer, expressly agreed "to defend, indemnify and hold harmless" BFI for all
personal or property damage claims "resulting from or arising in any manner out
of Customer's use, operation or possession of the equipment furnished under this
Agreement." Id. at 181-82, 510 A.2d at 1154.
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self was twenty-five percent negligent.1 5 The appellate division
affirmed this judgment, but reversed the law division's ruling respecting indemnification. 1 6 The appellate court ordered LCA to
17
indemnify BFI for Ramos's injuries.
The factual situation of the companion case involved Rocky
Lee Stephenson, 8 an employee of Sunshine Biscuits (Sunshine)
in Sayreville, New Jersey.' 9 Stephenson was wearing an ace
bandage while working on a cartoner machine. 20 The bandage
became entangled in the machine and caused her hand to be
drawn into the cartoner which resulted in severe injuries.21
The cartoner that caused Stephenson's injury was manufactured and sold by R.A. Jones (Jones) to Sunshine in 1970. 2 2 Subsequent to the sale of the cartoner, and prior to Stephenson's
injury, Jones received numerous reports from other plants regarding injuries associated with the use of the machine. 23 According to these reports, the injuries were attributable to the
rotating flap-separator pin on the cartoner.2 4 In immediate response, Jones designed a ball-detent unit to serve as a guard for
the pin and notified the cartoner owners of the reported injuries. 25 Jones also stated that it would send the new guards to the
cartoner owners.26
The ball-detent units were shipped to Sunshine's plant.2 7
Accordingly, at trial, Jones submitted evidence to substantiate
this claim. 28 The evidence, however, was deemed insufficient to
conclusively establish that the guards were actually received by
15 Id. at 181, 510 A.2d at 1153-54. The jury awarded Ramos $410,000 which
was reduced to $307,500 in view of the comparative negligence finding. Id.
16 Id. at 182, 510 A.2d at 1154. The appellate division determined that LCA
must indemnify BFI because of the parties' express agreement to that effect. Id.
Further, the court ruled that the Workers' Compensation statutes did not prevent
enforcement of this agreement. Id.
17 Id. at 181, 510 A.2d at 1154.
18 Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 196, 510 A.2d at 1162. During the course of litigation,
Stephenson's name was changed to O'Briant. Id.
19 Id. at 196-97, 510 A.2d at 1162. The plant in Sayreville is one of many plants
owned by Sunshine. Id.
20 Id. at 197, 510 A.2d at 1162. Stephenson had fallen earlier during the day
and sprained her wrist. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25

Id.

26

Id.
Id.
Id.

27

28
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the Sunshine plant.2 9 The guards were never installed at Sunshine's Sayreville plant.30
After filing a workers' compensation claim, Stephenson instituted suit against Jones charging negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty. 3 ' Jones filed a third party complaint against
the plaintiff's employer, Sunshine, and its insurer, Continental
Insurance Company, seeking either contribution or implied indemnification. 2 Sunshine moved for dismissal by claiming that
Jones' action was barred by the payments which Sunshine made
pursuant to the Workers' Compensation statute. 3 Sunshine's
motion was granted, and the case proceeded to trial with Jones as
the sole defendant.3 4 At trial, Jones was found five percent negligent in causing Stephenson's injuries. 5 As Jones was the only
remaining defendant, it was held liable to Stephenson for the full
$100,000 in damages. 3 6 Jones appealed the trial court's decision
that Sunshine was entitled to summary judgment.3 7 The appellate division affirmed and held, as a matter of law, that Jones was
38
not entitled to either indemnification or contribution.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification in both
cases.3 9 In Ramos, the supreme court reversed the appellate division and held that BFI was not entitled to contribution from the
injured plaintiff's employer, LCA.4 0 The court noted that if the
legislature intended to change the statutory scheme to allow a
29 Id.
30 Id.

The guards were installed at some of Sunshine's plants, but not at the
Sayreville plant. Id. The absence of the guards was not discovered until 1980, even
though a Jones' representative made regular maintenance visits between 1974 and
1980. Id. When the absence of the guards was finally discovered, Jones sent a
letter to Sunshine strongly advising that the guards be installed. Id. However,
neitherJones nor Sunshine installed the safety guards. Id. Jones had the opportunity to install the guards but did not offer to install them. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 197-98, 510 A.2d at 1162.
33 Id. at 198, 510 A.2d at 1162; see also infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text
(discussion and analysis of New Jersey's Workmen's Compensation statute).
34 Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 198, 510 A.2d at 1162-63. Jones dismissed its claim
against Sunshine's insurance carrier. Id.
35 Id. at 198, 570 A.2d at 1163. A special interrogatory was submitted to the
court asking the jury to determine the percentage of negligence attributable to
Jones and Sunshine respectively. Id. Thejury determined thatJones was 5% negligent and that Sunshine was 95% negligent. Id.
36 See id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus., 101 N.J. 211, 501 A.2d 894 (1985); Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co., Inc., 101 N.J. 238, 501 A.2d 914 (1985).
40 Ramos, 103 N.J. at 181, 193, 510 A.2d at 1154, 1159.
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third party to obtain contribution from the employer, it could
have done so in 1979 when the Workers' Compensation Act was
revised. 4 ' Noting that no such changes occurred, the court
stated that it was not the province of the courts to judicially modify the existing statutory scheme.4 2 In Stephenson, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling and determined that Jones was
not entitled to contribution since Sunshine was not a joint
tortfeasor.4" The court also held that Jones was not entitled to
implied indemnification because a special legal relationship did
not exist.4 4 Further, the court stated that even if a special legal
relationship existed, Jones was precluded from seeking implied
indemnification because it was not personally free from fault.4 5
At common law, an employee could maintain an action in
tort against an employer if a personal injury was sustained and
was proximately caused by the employer's breach of duty.4 6 It
was often difficult, however, to prove causation and fault on the
part of the employer.47 Even if these imposing barriers were
crossed and the employee established a prima facie case, the employer usually escaped liability by asserting the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, or the fellowservant rule.4" Therefore, the employee, often unable to work,
41 Id. at 188, 510 A.2d at 1158.
42
43

Id. at 190, 510 A.2d at 1158.
Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 199, 510 A.2d at 1163.

44 Id
45 Id
46 See

D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
§ 80 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. At common law, an employer could be held liable to an employee for breaching one of five duties. These
were:
(1) The duty to provide a safe place to work.
(2) The duty to provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment for the
work.
(3) The duty to give warning of dangers of which the employee might
reasonably be expected to remain in ignorance.
(4) The duty to provide a sufficient number of fellow servants.
(5) The duty to promulgate and enforce rules for the conduct of employees which would make work safe.
Id. § 80, at 569 (citations omitted).
47 See Lynch, The Clash Between Strict Products Liability Doctrine and the Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Rule: The Negligent Employer and the Third-Party,Manufacturer, 50
INS. COUNS. J. 35, 36 Uan. 1983). The information needed is often unavailable to
the employee. See id.
48 See deLeon, Workers' Compensation: A Legal System in Jeopardy, 29 FED'N INS.
COUNS. Q 337, 338 (1979). Pursuant to the fellow servant rule, an employer could
not be held liable if the negligence of a fellow-servant proximately caused injuries
to a co-employee. See PROSSER, supra note 46, § 80, at 571.
W.

KEETON,

LAW OF TORTS
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turned to the state for financial assistance.49
To ameliorate the harsh effects of the common law doctrine,
legislatures in the early 1900's began to adopt workers' compensation statutes. 50 These laws were designed to impose strict liability on an employer for an employee's employment-related
injuries.51 In NewJersey, this objective was accomplished by the
incorporation of the exclusivity provision into the Workers'
Compensation statute.52 The act also provides that an employee's exclusive remedy for injuries "arising out of and in the
course of employment" is the payment specifically designated by
the statute. 5 3 As a result, an employer's liability is no longer determined on a fault basis. 54 Thus, a statutory balance is struck.
Although an employee loses the common law redress of suing
the employer in tort, he or she is assured of a definite and determinate recovery.55
Workers' compensation awards, however, were often inadequate in fully compensating an injured employee. 56 Accordingly,
employees filed suits against third parties because the compensation acts did not prevent an injured employee from suing a third
49 CARL J.

VALORE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW IN NEW JERSEY: PRACTICE,

1, 3 (New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education,
1980) (citing Parkinson v. J & S Tool Co., 64 N.J. 159, 167, 313 A.2d 609, 614
(1974)).
50 See Lynch, supra note 47, at 39.
51 See VALORE, supra note 49, at 3.
52 See supra note 8 for text of statute. While this provision is elective, it arises by
implication in every employment contract. See Gotkin v. Weinberg, 2 N.J. 305, 308,
66 A.2d 438, 439 (1949).
53 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West Supp. 1986). Pursuant to this provision:
When an employer and employee shall by agreement, either express or implied, as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of this
article compensation for personal injuries to, or for the death of, such
employee by accident arising out of and in the course of employment
shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the
employer....
Id.
54 See PROSSER, supra note 46, § 80, at 573; see also Danek v. Hommer, 9 N.J. 56,
59, 87 A.2d 5, 6 (1952) (aim of statute was to "substitute, either by compulsion or
by the voluntary act of the employers, for the common law liability for negligence, a
definite payment by the employer, irrespective of negligence, which shall reach the
workman or his dependents quickly and with small expense.") (quoting Sexton v.
Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 84 N.J.L. 85, 100, 86 A. 451, 457 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd, 86
N.J.L. 701, 91 A. 1070 (N.J. 1914)).
55 See Lynch, supra note 47, at 39.
56 Id. at 40. Since this award is not designed to make the employee whole, the
injured employee cannot recover damages for "pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, and impairment of actual earning capacity." Id.; see also
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
PROCEDURE & SYSTEMS
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party in cases in which a product caused the injury.5 7 The resultant inequities for the third parties were two-fold. 58 First, since
the employee could not sue the employer in tort, the manufacturer, as a joint tortfeasor, was liable for the full amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff. 59 Second, in the event of a third
party recovery, the employer or the employer's workers' compensation carrier was entitled to recover payments made to the employee. 6 ' To alleviate these inequitable results, manufacturers
filed third party complaints against the employers seeking either
contribution or indemnification. 6 '
In New Jersey, however, a manufacturer is effectively precluded from succeeding on a third party claim for contribution
based on an employer's concurrent negligence. 62 While "recovery over" from joint tortfeasors is statutorily mandated, 6 an em57

Id.
58

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1978). Pursuant to this section:
Where a third person is liable to the employee or his dependents for an
injury or death, the existence of a right of compensation from the employer or insurance carrier under this statute shall not operate as a bar
to the action of the employee or his dependents, nor be regarded as
establishing a measure of damage therein....
See Larson, supra note 3, at 485.

59 See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-1 (West 1978). This section provides
in pertinent part that "the term 'joint tortfeasors' means two or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether
or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them." Id.
60 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1959). This section provides in pertinent part:
(b) If the sum recovered by the employee or.his dependents from the
third person or his insurance carrier is equivalent to or greater than the
liability of the employer or his insurance carrier under this statute, the
employer or his insurance carrier shall be released from such liability
and shall be entitled to be reimbursed, as hereinafter provided, for the
medical expenses incurred and compensation payments theretofore
paid to the injured employee or his dependents less employee's expenses of suit and attorney's fee. ...
Id.
61 See Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 133 N.J. Super. 362, 365, 336 A.2d
508, 509 (Law Div. 1975).
62 See Comment, supra note 4, at 263-67.
63 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-3 (West 1978) which provides in part:
Where injury or damage is suffered by any person as a result of the
wrongful act, neglect, or default ofjoint tortfeasors, and the person so
suffering injury or damage recovers a money judgment or judgments for
such injury or damage against one or more of the joint tortfeasors,
either in one action or in separate actions, and any one of the joint
tortfeasors pays such judgment in whole or in part, he shall be entitled
to recover contribution from the other joint tortfeasor or joint
tortfeasors for the excess so paid over his pro rata share ....
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ployer is determined not to be a joint tortfeasor because liability
stemming from the exclusivity provision is imposed regardless of
fault. 64 This principle was evidenced in 1954 in Farren v. New
Jersey Turnpike Authority. 65 There, the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court held that a third party is not entitled
to a pro rata reduction in the amount of the injured party's recovery as a result of the employer's negligence.6 6
More than twenty years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court
refused to alter this doctrinal stance. In Schweizer v. Elox Division
of Colt Industries,6 7 the manufacturer filed a third party complaint
against the employer and the employer's workers' compensation
carrier seeking a reduction in liability to the extent of payments
made by the carrier. 68 According to the court, the employer's
concurrent negligence was not a factor to be considered in the
apportionment of liability. 69 Rather, the employer's liability was
limited to the payments proscribed by the statute. 70 The court
also stressed that the statute explicitly provides for an employer's
entitlement to reimbursement if the sums recovered from a third
party recovery exceed the sums expended by the employer in satisfying the mandatory compensation liability. 7 ' Therefore, the
Schweizer court held that the third party manufacturer was not en72
titled to have the plaintiff's award against it reduced pro tanto
by the payments made by the employer.7 3
64 See LARSON, supra note 6, § 78, at 610. The rationale for this is such that
"[w]hen the third party, in a suit by the employee, seeks recovery over against a
contributorily negligent employer, contribution is ordinarily denied on the ground
that the employer cannot be said to be jointly liable in tort to the employee because
of the operation of the exclusive-remedy clause." Id. The term "recovery over" is
a standard term used in cases, articles and law reviews. See, e.g., Larson, Workmen's
Compensation: Third Party'sAction Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 351, 351
(1970).
65 31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (App. Div. 1954).
66 Id. at 361-62, 106 A.2d at 755; but cf Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,
153, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391 (1972) (third party defendant
could pro-ratably recover contribution from employer).
67 70 N.J. 280, 359 A.2d 857 (1976).
68 Id. at 284, 359 A.2d at 859.
69 Id. at 287, 359 A.2d at 861.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 286, 359 A.2d at 860.
72 Pro tanto is defined as "partial payment made on a claim." BLAcK's LAw DicTIONARY, 1100 (5th ed. 1979).
73 Schweizer, 70 N.J. at 287-88, 359 A.2d at 861. But see Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa.
180, 189-92, 14 A.2d 105, 110-11 (1940) (third party manufacturer could recover
contribution to extent of employer's workers' compensation payments). This holding was changed by statutory amendment codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 § 481b
(Purdon 1986); compare Wittv. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr.
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In 1977, in Arcell v. Ashland Chemical Co., Inc..,' M the New
Jersey Superior Court addressed the issue of whether Farren was
impliedly overruled by the legislature's adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act. 75 In Arcell, several chemical manufacturers
sold their products to American Can Company and were sued
when the chemicals caused severe personal injuries and death to
American Can employees.7 6 American Can was ultimately
brought in as a third party defendant, and later fourth-partied Du
Pont seeking contribution and indemnification. 7 7 Du Pont noted
that, pursuant to the Comparative Negligence Act, a joint
tortfeasor who has paid a larger share of the plaintiff's award is
entitled to "contribution from the other tortfeasors. 7 8 Du Pont
argued that the absence of a definition of the term "joint
tortfeasor" in the Comparative Negligence Act implied that the
legislature gave the manufacturer the right to comparative contribution.7 9 In rejecting this argument, the court stressed "that
statutes in pari materia8 ° must be construed with reference to each
other ... .",81 Therefore, the court determined that the definition
of the term 'joint tortfeasor" in the Contribution Act was similarly applicable to the term 'joint tortfeasor" in the Comparative
Negligence Act.8 2 Based on Farren, the Arcell court denied Du
Pont any recovery from American Can under the Comparative
Negligence Act.8 3
While third party manufacturers in New Jersey have been
unsuccessful in obtaining contribution from negligent employers, they also have had limited success with claims of indemnification. 8 4 In these situations, if a contract of sale between a
manufacturer and an employer contained an explicit waiver of
the exclusive remedy provision, New Jersey courts have allowed
369 (1961) (employers' workmen's compensation payment should be deducted
from amount employee recovers from third party).
74 152 N.J. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (Law Div. 1977).
75 Id. at 484, 378 A.2d at 60.
76 Id. at 481, 378 A.2d at 58.
77 Id. at 482, 378 A.2d at 58.
78 Id. at 484, 378 A.2d at 60 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:15-5.3 (West 1978)).
79 Id.
80 In pari materia means "upon the same matter or subject." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY, 711 (5th ed. 1979).
81 Arcell, 152 N.J. Super. at 484, 378 A.2d at 60.
82 Id. at 485, 378 A.2d at 60.
83 See id.
84 See, e.g., Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 133 N.J. Super. 362, 368, 336
A.2d 508, 511 (Law Div. 1975); see also infra notes 103-115 and accompanying text
(discussion of Ruvolo I and II).
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the manufacturer to proceed with a claim for indemnification. 85
In the absence of an express waiver, however, the manufacturer's
claim for indemnification must be based on an implied promise.86
Moreover, the existence of a special legal relationship must be
established by the manufacturer in order to prove that an implied
promise existed. 87 Even if such a relationship is established, the
manufacturer's entitlement to implied indemnification is not absolute.8 8 The manufacturer also must be without personal
fault.89

Relationships which qualify as special legal relationships inprincipal and agent, 9 ' and lessor and
92
lessee.
The special legal relationship exception was first examined by the New Jersey Superior Court in 1960 in Hagen v.
Koerner.9 3 In Hagen, the executrix of the deceased's estate
brought an action against ten of the deceased's co-employees. 94
One of the co-employees filed a third party complaint against the
employer alleging that he had acted pursuant to instructions
given by the employer. 95 As a result, the co-employee claimed he
was entitled to indemnification. 96 In affirming the claim, the
court determined that an agency relationship existed between the
employer and co-employee which created an independent duty
flowing from the employer to the co-employee.9 7 This relation98
ship was sufficient to constitute a special legal relationship.

clude bailor and bailee,

85 See, e.g., Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 N.J. Super. 379, 384, 92 A.2d 873,
876 (Law Div. 1952).
86 See Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 139 N.J. Super. 578, 583, 354 A.2d
685, 688 (Law Div. 1976).
87 See id.
88 See Arcell, 152 N.J. Super. at 488-89, 378 A.2d at 62; see supra notes 74-83 and
accompanying text (discussion of Arcell).
89 See Ramos, 103 N.J. at 188-89, 510 A.2d at 1158. As a general rule, the third
party's liability must be imputed or constructive. See Hut v. Antonio, 95 N.J. Super.
62, 69, 229 A.2d 823, 827 (Law Div. 1967). New Jersey has rejected the active
passive rule whereby a passive tortfeasor can recover from an active tortfeasor.
Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 433-34, 119 A.2d
172, 180 (App. Div. 1955).
90 See Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal.2d 200, 214, 148 P.2d 633, 641 (1944).
91 See Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J. Super. 580, 587, 166 A.2d 784, 787-88 (App.
Div. 1960).
92 See Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 133 N.J. Super. 362, 368, 336 A.2d
508, 511 (Law Div. 1975).
93 64 N.J. Super. 580, 166 A.2d 784 (App. Div. 1960).
94 Id. at 582, 166 A.2d at 785.
95 Id.

96 Id.

97 See id. at 584-85, 166 A.2d at 786.
98 See id. While Arcell answered the question whether or not a vendor-vendee
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Therefore, the court determined that the employee had a valid
claim for indemnification. 99
The Hagen court stressed that as a general rule the indemnitee must also be without personal fault.' 0 0 Although the employee was found to be at fault, the court determined that based
on the facts he was entitled to indemnification.' 0 ' The need for
this limited exception to the general rule was removed the following year when the New Jersey Legislature immunized employees from suit by their injured co-employees in the absence of
proof that the injuries were intentionally caused by the co02
employee.
The issue whether a manufacturer could recover from an
employer on the theory of implied indemnification was first encountered by the NewJersey Superior Court in 1975 in Ruvolo v.
United States Steel (Ruvolo 1).103 There, the plaintiff sued a
machine manufacturer after a wire pierced his eye causing severe
injury. 10 4 The manufacturer, who had leased the machine to the
employer, failed to attach a warning to the machine on which the
plaintiff was working. 10 5 The manufacturer filed a third party
complaint against the employer for implied indemnification.' ° 6
In response, the employer filed a motion to dismiss based on the
relationship constituted a special legal relationship, it raised a potentially troublesome question. In dicta, the court implied that a manufacturer need not be without
fault if there is the existence of a special legal relationship. See Arcell, 152 N.J.
Super. at 489, 378 A.2d at 62. The court stated in dicta that "in the absence of a
special legal relationship a claim for implied indemnification is necessarily based on
the theory that both parties are jointly liable for the injury with the employer's
negligence being greater in degree or more culpable than that of a third party." Id.
(emphasis added). This suggested that the holding in Hagen was not merely a limited exception but a precedent to be followed. The Hagen court had allowed the
defendant employee to recover indemnification based on the agency relationship
even though the employee was not without personal fault. See Hagen, 64 N.J. Super.
at 586, 166 A.2d at 787.
99 Id. at 587, 166 A.2d at 788.
100 Id. at 586, 166 A.2d at 787.
10o See id. at 588-89, 166 A.2d at 788.
102 SeeRamos, 103 N.J. at 190, 510 A.2d at 1159. In 1961, the NewJersey Legislature immunized employees who injure co-employees from liability except when the
injuries are intentionally caused. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1986).
That amendment, in effect, removed the necessity for the exception insofar as coemployees are concerned.
103 133 N.J. Super. 362, 336 A.2d 508 (Law Div. 1975).
104 Id. at 364, 336 A.2d at 509.
105 See id. at 365, 336 A.2d at 509.
106 Id.
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exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. 107 The
court denied the employer's motion, holding that a lessor and
lessee relationship constituted a special legal relationship.° 8 According to the court, this relationship was a sufficient basis on
which to predicate a claim for implied indemnification.' 0 9
In Ruvolo v. United States Steel (Ruvolo II),'o the court was
faced with the task of formulating a judgment in light of the facts
presented in Ruvolo ."
The Ruvolo II court entered partial
judgment on behalf of the employer." 1 2 The court determined
that the manufacturer and the employer were jointly negligent.' " Since the manufacturer was negligent, it could not
"claim the benefit due a blameless third party. ..."',1 In so holding, the court recognized that a special legal relationship alone is
not a sufficient basis for implied indemnification. 115
In Ramos v. Browning FerrisIndustries, the New Jersey Supreme
Court clarified the issues left open since Arcell." 6 Writing for a
unanimous court, Justice Pollock initially noted that an express
contract for indemnification did not exist.' 17 The court then addressed the issue whether there was a sufficient basis for a claim
of implied indemnification." 8 The court viewed the relationship
between the manufacturer and employer as being merely that of
vendor and vendee.'' In light of Arcell, the court ruled that this
120
affiliation did not constitute a special legal relationship.
Moreover, the Ramos court firmly established that the indemnitee must be without personal fault. 12 1 In its holding, the court
explicitly confined the analysis used by the Hagen court to the
107 Id. at 364, 336 A.2d at 509; see also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text
(discussion of exclusivity provision).
108 Ruvolo 1, 133 N.J. Super. at 368, 336 A.2d at 511.

109 Id.

110 139 N.J. Super. 578, 354 A.2d 685 (Law Div. 1976).
''' Id. at 581, 354 A.2d at 687.
112 Id. at 587, 354 A.2d at 690.
113 Id. at 584-85, 354 A.2d at 689-90.
114 Id. at 584, 354 A.2d at 689.
115 See id., 354 A.2d at 688-89.
116 See Ramos, 103 N.J. at 188-89, 510 A.2d at 1158; see also supra note 98 (discussing dicta in Arcell).
117 See Ramos, 103 N.J. at 181, 510 A.2d at 1153.
118 See id. at 188-89, 510 A.2d at 1158.
''9 See id. at 189, 510 A.2d at 1158.
120 Id. The court determined that "implying indemnity on the basis of a purchase
would be tantamount to creating a reverse warranty running from the employervendee to the third-party vendor." Id.
121 Id. at 188-89, 510 A.2d at 1158.
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factual situation presented in that case. 12 2 Therefore, for a manufacturer to succeed on its claim for indemnification, the court
held that the third party must be personally free from fault and a
special legal relationship must exist. 123
In Ramos, the manufacturer attempted to rely on Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc.,124 to support its contention that a
special legal relationship need not exist if the manufacturer is
free from fault. 1 25 In Adler's, the owner of an airplane was held
statutorily liable for injuries, personal property damages, and pecuniary losses sustained by individuals living near a tower into
which his airplane collided. 12 6 The owner of the airplane sought
leave to amend his third party complaint against the owner of the
tower to include a claim for indemnification. 127 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that if the owner of the airplane could prove
that his fault was imputed or constructive as a result of the imposition of strict liability, he would be entitled to indemnification
the court granted the
from the tower owner.' 28 Therefore,
1 29
complaint.
his
amend
to
owner leave
The Ramos court expressly rejected the extension of the
holding in Adler's to a factual situation involving a manufacturer
and an employer. 130 The court stressed that if a third party could
recover against the employer in the absence of a special legal relationship then the employer's statutory right to subrogation
would be subverted. 13 ' Therefore, the Ramos court determined
exist in addition to the manthat a special legal relationship must
32
ufacturer's freedom from fault.1
The identical issue concerning whether a third party manufacturer could "recover over" from a negligent employer was adId. at 190, 510 A.2d at 1159.
Id. at 188-89, 510 A.2d at 1158.
124 32 N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97 (1960).
125 See Ramos, 103 N.J. at 189, 510 A.2d at 1158.
126 Adler's, 32 NJ. at 64-66, 159 A.2d at 101-02.
127 Id. at 66, 159 A.2d at 102.
128 Id. at 79, 159 A.2d at 109.
129 Id. at 84, 159 A.2d at 112.
130 See Ramos, 103 N.J. at 189-90, 510 A.2d at 1158. The Ramos court confined
the Adler's holding by stating that "[tlo the extent that it recognized an indemnity
claim in the absence of a special relationship, the decision illustrates the proposition that 'it is extremely difficult to state any general rule or principle as to when
indemnity will be allowed and when it will not.' " Id. (citing PROSSER, supra note 46,
§ 51, at 343).
131 See id. at 190, 510 A.2d at 1158.
132 Id. at 188-89, 510 A.2d at 1158.
122
123
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dressed in Stephenson v. R.A. Jones & Co. 13 Relying on Ramos, the
Stephenson court held that a third party defendant manufacturer 1 is
4
precluded from recovering contribution from an employer.
Furthermore, the court conclusively established that a claim for
implied indemnification will be successful only if a special legal
35
relationship exists and the manufacturer is free from fault.
Justice Pollock, writing for the majority, first addressed
whether the employer, Sunshine, was liable to the manufacturer,
Jones, within the scope of the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution
Law or the Comparative Negligence Act. 13 6 Based on Farren and
its progeny, the majority summarily determined that Jones could
not maintain an action against Sunshine for contribution. 137
The majority next considered whether Jones had set forth a
sufficient basis for its implied indemnification claim.' 3 8 The
court stressed that a special legal relationship is crucial to enable
1 39
a manufacturer to recover against an employer on this theory.
Additionally, the court ruled that the manufacturer must be free
from fault. 14 ° The court then determined that Jones had met
neither of the two criteria.' 4 1 Justice Pollock pointed out that
Jones' fault had been established by thejury's determination that
it was five percent negligent. 142 Consequently, Jones' liability
was neither constructive nor vicarious. 14 The majority then
noted that a vendor and vendee relationship was not a special
legal relationship. 144 The court stressed that the failure of a
manufacturer to meet either of the two criteria would preclude it
from seeking implied indemnification."'
Justice Stein, in a dissenting opinion, recognized that a claim
for contribution did not exist. 14 6 Justice Stein, however, sharply
133 103 NJ. at 196, 510 A.2d at 1162 (1986).
134 Id. at 199, 510 A.2d at 1163.

Id. at 200, 510 A.2d at 1163-64.
See id. at 199-200, 510 A.2d at 1163.
17 Id. at 199, 510 A.2d at 1163.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 200, 510 A.2d at 1164.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 199, 510 A.2d at 1163.
142 Id.
143 See id. The court asserted that "[g]iven the jury's finding that Jones's negligence is less than that of Sunshine, the effect of the legislative scheme may seem
harsh. But we cannot distinguish in principle between a third-party tortfeasor that
is 5% negligent and one that is 95% negligent." Id.
144 See id.
145 Id. at 201, 510 A.2d at 1164.
146 See id. at 205-07, 510 A.2d at 1166-67 (Stein, J., dissenting).
135
136
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disagreed with the majority's holding that a claim for implied indemnification can be predicated on the existence of a special
legal relationship and the absence of fault on the part of the manufacturer. 14 7 Instead,Justice Stein opined that a third party manufacturer could recover implied indemnification with the
existence of only one of these two criteria. 4 8 In support of this
proposition, Justice Stein relied on Arcell, in which the court implied in dictum that the two theories of recovery were analytically
distinct. 149 To illustrate that these theories were distinct, Justice
Stein relied on the precedents set forth in the Hagen and Adler's
decisions. 5 ° Accordingly, the Justice posited that, if a special
legal relationship existed, Jones' liability need not be vicarious
for it to succeed on its indemnity claim.' 5 ' Thus, Justice Stein
would have shifted the focus to whether the relationship between
Jones and Sunshine created a duty on Sunshine to allow Jones to
152
fix the cartoner.
The dissent argued that although Jones was at fault, the
existence of a special legal relationship between the manufacturer and the employer allowed the manufacturer's recovery of
implied indemnification.' 5 3 Justice Stein relied on Roy v. Star
Chopper Co.,' 5 4 to support this contention.' 5 5 In Star Chopper, an
injured employee sued a third party manufacturer for its negligence in failing to install a safety guard on a machine.' 5 6 The
manufacturer filed a third party claim for implied indemnification
against the employer premised on the fact that the employer had
designed the machine and explicitly represented to the manufacturer that it would install any necessary safety devices. 15 7 The
Star Chopper court determined that the employer, by failing to install the safety devices, had breached an independent duty which
147 See id. at 208-09, 510 A.2d at 1168 (Stein, J., dissenting).

Id. at 212, 510 A.2d at 1170 (Stein, J., dissenting).
id.
150 See id. at 211, 510 A.2d at 1170 (Stein, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 93102 and accompanying text (discussion of Hagen); notes 124-29 and accompanying
text (discussion of Adler's).
151 Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 212, 510 A.2d at 1170 (Stein, J., dissenting).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 217, 510 A.2d at 1173 (Stein, J., dissenting).
154 442 F. Supp. 1010 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
'55 See Stephenson, 103 NJ. at 213-15, 510 A.2d at 1171-72 (Stein, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 213, 510 A.2d at 1171 (Stein,J., dissenting) (relying on Star Chopper, 442
F. Supp. at 1012).
157 Id. (relying on Star Chopper, 442 F. Supp. at 1019).
148

149 See
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58

it owed to the manufacturer.
Analogizing Star Chopper to the factual situation presented in
Stephenson, Justice Stein reasoned that Sunshine's intentional acts
in not installing the guards, or alternatively in not permitting
Jones to install the guards, created a jury question as to whether
Sunshine had breached the independent duty it owed toJones.159
According to the dissent, either of these two intentional acts
would constitute a breach of duty by Sunshine.' 60 Thus, Justice
Stein concluded that Jones should be entitled to implied
indemnification.'"
As the majority pointed out, there are two central flaws in
The disthe dissent's analysis.'" 2 The first is a factual flaw.'
sent's analysis is predicated on the assumption that Sunshine's
actions were intentional. 16 4 Evidence produced at trial, however,
65
was not sufficient to prove that Sunshine received the guards.'
Thus, Sunshine's failure to install the guards, if in fact they were
received, amounted to negligence. 166 Even if the employer was
jointly negligent with the manufacturer, the employer was
16 7
shielded from suit based on the Workers' Compensation Act.
The second flaw, according to the majority, is in the dissent's
legal analysis.'" 8 The dissent failed to consider the holding in
Ramos.' 9 The Ramos court conclusively established that a manu158 Id. at 214, 510 A.2d at 1172 (Stein,J., dissenting) (relying on Star Chopper, 442
F. Supp. at 1020-21).
159 Id. at 215, 510 A.2d at 1172 (Stein, J., dissenting).
160 See id. Justice Stein explained his rationale by stating that "[t]here would be a
strange inconsistency in our products liability law were we to impose a duty on
manufacturers to correct a defect discovered after sale and simultaneously insulate
from liability an employer who refuses to install a safety device provided by the
manufacturer to make the machine safe." Id. at 217, 510 A.2d at 1173 (Stein, J.,
dissenting).
161 Id. at 219, 510 A.2d at 1174 (Stein, J., dissenting).
162 See id. at 199-200, 510 A.2d at 1163-64.
163 See id. at 199, 510 A.2d at 1163.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 197, 510 A.2d at 1162; see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
166 See Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 200, 510 A.2d at 1163.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 200, 510 A.2d at 1164.
169 See id. The majority stated that:
The flaw in the dissent's legal analysis is the notion that even a manufacturer that is primarily liable in tort to an employee may recover indemnification from the employer as long as a special relationship exists
between the third party and the employer. A special relationship alone,
however, is not sufficient to require an employer to indemnify a thirdparty manufacturer. To recover indemnification from an employer, a
third party must be secondarily or vicariously liable, not personally at
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facturer could recover indemnification from a negligent employer only if a special legal relationship existed and the
indemnitee is without personal fault.' 17 Thus, by failing to consider the Ramos ruling, the dissent incorrectly determined that
the manufacturer must meet only one of these two criteria in order to recover implied indemnification. 171
Additional flaws are present in the dissent's legal analysis.
The dissent's reliance on the Adler's, Hagen, and Arcell decisions is
misplaced. The dissent argues that these cases support the contention that a manufacturer can recover indemnification if it is
personally free from fault or if a special legal relationship exists. 1 72 While the Hagen court allowed an employee whose fault
contributed to his co-employee's death to recover indemnifica17 3
tion from his employer because an agency relationship existed,
this holding was legislatively limited.1 74 After Hagen, the legislature amended New Jersey's Workmen's Compensation statute to
provide that employees are immune from suit for injuries sustained by their co-employees unless they intentionally inflict the
injuries. 175 Therefore, the rationale used by the Hagen court in
determining that the employee could recover indemnification
from the employer if a special legal relationship existed, irrespective of the employee's degree of fault, was no longer applicable.
Furthermore, the dissent failed to recognize that the court's
holding in Adler's was judicially limited.' 7 6 The Adler's court allowed an airplane owner to amend his third party complaint to
add a count for implied indemnification against the owner of a
radio tower with which his plane had collided. 177 Even though a
special legal relationship did not exist, the court stated that the
airplane owner's liability might be constructive or vicarious. 178 If
the airplane owner could prove that his fault was constructive or
fault. Thus, an employer may have an implied duty to indemnify a third
party 'when a special legal relationship exists between the employer and
the third party, and the liability of the third party is vicarious.'
Id. (citations omitted).
170 Ramos, 103 N.J. at 188-89, 510 A.2d at 1158.
171 See Stephenson, 103 NJ. at 200, 510 A.2d at 1164.
172 See id. at 211-12, 510 A.2d 1169-70 (Stein, J., dissenting).
173 See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussion of Hagen).
174 See Ramos, 103 NJ. at 190, 510 A.2d at 1159.
175 See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West 1978)); see also supra note 102.
176 See Ramos, 103 N.J. at 189-90, 510 A.2d at 1158;seealso infra notes 124-32 and
accompanying text.
177 See Adler's, 32 N.J. at 79, 159 A.2d at 109.
178 Id.
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vicarious, he was entitled to implied indemnification.' 79 The Ramos court in dicta rejected the extension of this holding to a situation where a manufacturer seeks to recover indemnification from
an employer.'8 ° Although the Ramos court noted that it is difficult to determine when a court will grant indemnification, the
court nevertheless made it clear that it was judicially limiting the
holding in Adler's to the facts of that case.'
In conjunction with Adler's and Hagen, the dissent relied on
Arcell to support the contention that the two theories of recovery
were analytically distinct. 8 2 While the Arcell court suggested in
dicta that either a special legal relationship must exist or the
manufacturer must be free from fault, 183 the Ramos court conclusively established that both criteria must be met.' 8 4 The fatal
flaw in the dissent's legal analysis is the failure to address the
subsequent legislative and judicial histories of the cases relied on
to support the theory for recovery of implied indemnification.
The dissent also improperly analogized the situation
presented in Star Chopper to that presented before the court in
Stephenson. The exception set forth in Star Chopper is commonly
referred to as the "dual capacity exception."' 8 5 This exception is
applicable when the employer occupies dual roles.'8 6 If, for example, the employer is also the manufacturer of a machine that is
used by its employees, then the employer owes the employees a
duty which is independent of the duty arising from the employment relationship.1 8 7 If the employer breaches this independent
duty, he is liable for any damages sustained by his employees. 8 8
An employee's recovery for damages sustained as a result of the
employer and employee relationship is statutorily precluded by
the Workers' Compensation statute.'8 9 Employees, however, are
not precluded from recovering for breach of an independent and
See id.
See Ramos, 103 N.J. at 189-90, 510 A.2d at 1158.
181 See id.
182 See Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 212, 510 A.2d at 1170 (Stein, J., dissenting).
183 Arcell, 152 N.J. Super. at 489, 378 A.2d at 62.
184 Ramos, 103 N.J. at 188-89, 510 A.2d at 1158.
185 See generally Ghiardi, Dual Capacity-An Exception to the Exclusivity of [Workers
Compensation, 33 FED'N INS. CouNs. 215, 219-24 (1983); Comment, The Dual Capacity
Doctrine: Piercing the Exclusive Remedy of IVorkers' Compensation, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV,.
1013, 1017-19 (1982).
186 See Ghiardi, supra note 185, at 219-24.
179

180

187 See id. at 222.
188 See id.
189 See N.J. STAT.

this provision.

ANN.

§ 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1986); see supra note 8 for text of
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separate duty.' 90
In Star Chopper, the court set forth a novel interpretation of
this exception by holding that it also creates an independent duty
flowing to the manufacturer.' 9 ' The Star Chopper court focused
on the employer's dual function of being both the employer and
the designer of the machine that caused the plaintiff's injuries.' 9 2
According to the court, the employer, by virtue of the dual positions it occupied, coupled with the explicit representations that it
would install the safety device, gave rise to an independent duty
flowing between the manufacturer and the employer. 93 The
court stressed that this exception could not be invoked if the only
relationship which existed was that of vendor and vendee. 94
A purview of Justice Stein's dissenting opinion leads to the
conclusion that the court in Star Chopper applied the dual capacity
exception based on the employer's representations. Using this
erroneous approach to the dual capacity exception, Justice Stein
improperly analogized Sunshine's alleged intentional refusal to
install the guards to the explicit representations used by the employer in Star Chopper.'9 5 In Star Chopper, however, the court's primary focus was on the employer's dual personality.' 9 6 In
Stephenson, the employer did not occupy dual roles.' 9 7 Therefore,
the dual capacity exception was inapplicable.
While the dissent's analysis may be flawed, the outcome of
the majority's holding is inequitable. A third party manufacturer
whose negligence may be minimal at best, is forced to shoulder
the burden of compensating the injured employee. Meanwhile,
although an employer's negligence may be conclusively established, he is statutorily exempt from suit. '19 These inequities
cannot be eradicated by judicial activism in interpreting Workers'
Compensation law.' 99 Rather, it is time for the NewJersey Legis19o See Ghiardi, supra note 185, at 219.
191 See Star Chopper, 442 F. Supp. at 1022. The court conceded "that this discussion steers an unchartered course... with regard to tort law generally." Id.
192 See id. at 1021.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1019. The court stated that "the mere fact of a contractual relationship
...does not necessarily give rise to an implied obligation to indemnity." Id.
195 See Stephenson,103 N.J. at 214-15, 510 A.2d at 1171 (Steinj., dissenting).
'9( See Star Chopper, 442 F. Supp. at 1021.
197 See Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 200. 510 A.2d at 1164.
198 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1986).
199 See Ramos, 103 N.J. at 188, 510 A.2d at 1158. The Ramos court stated that
"[a]s tempting as it may be in a given case to temper the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and to permit a third party to recover
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lature to become cognizant of the inherent inequities and amend
the current Workers' Compensation statute.
The justifications which exist for keeping the current statute
are negligible at best. The statutes were designed to shift liability
away from the general public and back onto the employer.200 Because the employer generally purchases insurance, the costs are
effectively shifted back since the employer passes the cost of the
premium he must pay in the form of higher prices for the goods
or service he supplies.201 In addition, by allowing the employer
to recover payments it has made in the event of a third party recovery, the employer has no incentive to make necessary
improvements 202
In balancing the interests of the manufacturer, the employer,
and the employee, the most effective solution would be for the
New Jersey Legislature to amend the existing statute to allow a
manufacturer's liability to be reduced by the payments made by
the employer if the employer is concurrently negligent. The employer should not be entitled to reimbursement of its payments.
Utilizing this approach, the interests of all parties are protected.
The injured employee's amount of recovery remains unchanged.
The manufacturer's liability is reduced in the event that the employer is concurrently negligent. The employer will be precluded only from recovering its payments if it was negligent. By
adopting this solution, the Legislature will restore some sense of
equity in what has become an inequitable area of the law.
Jean A. Engels
against the employer, we defer to the balance of interests as struck by the Legislature." Id.
200 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (basic tenet of workers' compensation statutes).
201 VALORE, supra note 49, at 3.
202 See Stephenson, 103 N.J. at 217 n.16, 501 A.2d at 1173 n.16 (Stein, J., dissenting); see also supra note 60 for text of N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-40 (West 1959), which
creates a lien on the amount recovered from third parties by employees and constitutes reimbursement to the employer.

